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INTRODUCTION: CLIMATE CHANGE AND
THE DEVELOPING WORLD
…“future-oriented concern for climate change has
drawn attention (of the developed countries) away
from the economic misery and ecological
degradation endemic in large parts of the world
today. Disaster is not something for which the
poorest have to wait; it is a frequent occurrence”
(P. Dasgupta in Vaitheeswaran, 2002).
It should be stressed at the outset that climate change
is not the major concern of most people living in the
developing world. Events potentially happening two
or three decades in the future do not have much
resonance in countries mired in trying to climb out of
extreme poverty now. Hence, the issues of time and
economic costs and benefits are critical in any
discussion of water development in the developing
world and how this influences the availability of the
resource in terms of quantity and variability.

mistakes of excess pollution, or inappropriate allocation of
the resource, made in the recent past tells us that even
under the best conditions (in the developed countries) our
approaches are lagging behind needs and under the worst
conditions (the developing countries) have produced major
problems which cannot be easily solved. All of these
concerns are magnified by the suspicion that we may be
entering a period of rapid human-induced climate change
with very uncertain implications for water resource
management. Despite what may occur in the future, the
overhang of existing problems in the developed countries
seems to necessitate fairly radical reevaluation of the
prevailing approaches that have placed us in this situation.
From a climate point of view the conventional wisdom
appears to be best expressed as:
•

“Climate change will lead to an intensification of the
global hydrological cycle and can have major impacts
on regional water resources, affecting both ground
and surface water supply for domestic and industrial
uses, irrigation, hydropower generation, navigation,
in-stream ecosystems and water-based recreation.”

•

“The impacts of climate change will depend on the
baseline condition of the water supply system and the
ability of water resource managers to respond not
only to climate change but also to population growth
and changes in demands, technology, and economic,
social and legislative conditions” (IPCC, TAR, 2001).

CHALLENGING PREVAILING WISDOM
At any time in the history of the development of
resources management there is the suspicion that,
somehow or other, things are not working out as
originally planned. At the outset of the 21st century
this is true of many areas such as energy, agriculture,
and climate, and is particularly true for water
resources management. It is tempting to say that
everything that could be said about water
management has already been said. A couple of
centuries of diligent research and development have
provided scientific concepts, technology, laws, and
management institutions which, by and large, have
served to meet most of society’s material needs. So,
why challenge this wisdom, and why now?
It turns out, however, that the conventional approaches
have been shown to be not effective in protecting the
resource even for the current situation and to be widely
viewed as not being able to address future needs and
demands under a highly uncertain future. The ever
increasing need to spend large sums to correct
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The first quotation refers to the physical world and the
uses of the water itself (the hardware), the second refers to
the societal actions and behaviors (the software). The first
quotation is the future that may lead us to panic in the face
of dwindling resources; the second gives us the hope that
we can use the hardware and the software in conjunction
to deal effectively with the challenges implied in the first
quotation. I believe that conventional wisdom has all the
tools needed to help humankind weather the water
resources challenges posed by rapid climate change.
IN DEFENSE OF CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
It is often that the conventional wisdom, if properly
examined, already contains the seeds for challenging the
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way the water community currently does business. I
believe that conventional wisdom and conventionally
accepted concepts and ideas about water could, if
understood as a whole, significantly improve the
sustainability of water as a resource and as a pillar of
the ecosystem within which we all live in the face of
the real possibilities of climate change. Part of the
problem is that conventional wisdom is not so widely
understood as it appears and not so widely applied.
SOME FACTS OF LIFE FOR WATER
There are nine very important facts-of-life
concerning water, which are well known, but
generally not understood by all of the different water
constituencies. They are certainly never quoted
together as the fabric or the framework under which
to view water problems.
Asymmetries in Water Use
There are two ways of characterizing water use;
withdrawals and consumption. Withdrawals reflect
the amounts of water removed from the water source
for use and consumption is the amount of water
actually consumed or evaporated in the production
process. For most uses small amounts of water are
actually consumed with the bulk returning, albeit in
some cases polluted, to the water source. Irrigation
uses, however, typically evaporate more than 70
percent of the withdrawn water. Industry, particularly
heavy industry and fossil fuel electric generation,
withdraw huge amounts of water, but consume little.
Municipal and commercial withdrawals are typically
the smallest withdrawals with about 20 percent
consumptive use.
Blue/Green/BrownWater
Falkenmark (2001) made a revolutionary change in
how we look at the hydrological cycle. She pointed
out that water balances typically kept track only of
the blue water. By this she means all of the water that
appears as runoff to the streams and as groundwater
recharge, but the green water involved in supporting
the non-irrigated lands of the globe does not appear
directly in the balances. Using this concept, Postel et
al., (1996) show a global water balance that truly
reflects the use of both blue and green water for
supporting humanity and the ecosystem. They
showed that of the 110,300 cubic kms per year
Reusable Fresh Water Supply on the land surface of
the globe, only 40,700 were blue water, and 69,600
were green water. They also showed that human
appropriations of the green water were almost three
times as large as those of the blue water. The

possibility of using more of the green water and reducing
the demands on the blue water are active questions that
could lead to dealing more easily with feeding future
populations.
Irrigation Flywheel
In many countries of the world, as much as 60-95 percent
of all water is consumed by irrigated agriculture. This
fact is extremely important when looking toward
potential future water shortages. Typically, a 10%
reduction in irrigation would more than double the water
available for industrial and municipal uses. In other
words, provided that effective wastewater management
programs are in place, the amounts of water made
available for municipalities and industries could be
effectively doubled. The question then hinges on whether
or not such a 10% reduction in irrigation efficiencies
could be achieved (or equivalent areas for rainfed crops
developed) at the same time as agriculture is being
expanded to meet increasing demands for food, fiber,
and other industrial crops.
Virtual Water Escape Hatch
Directly related to the irrigation flywheel is what Allan
(2001) characterized as the use of imports of food crops
as a substitute for use of domestic water for irrigation.
Essentially the importing country is importing the water
that was used to grow the crops in the exporting country.
This virtual water can amount to as much as 1,000-5,000
tons of water per ton of crop imported. Hence, an import
of 2 million tons of food from a rain-fed source will save
the importer 2-10 billion tons (or 2-10 cubic km; the
annual average flow of the Nile is approximately 60
cubic km) of domestic water. Virtual water, through the
global food trade, can help overcome the wide disparities
between the distributions of water resources among
countries. Based upon estimates of the world agricultural
trade, virtual water could amount to as much as 700-800
km3 per year (Ramirez and Rogers, 2002; Hoekstra and
Hung, 2002).
Low Cost Desalination Breakthrough
Recent developments in membrane filtration combined
with reverse osmosis have revolutionized the potential
for widespread application of desalination. Prices as low
as U.S. $0.49 per cubic meter (about U.S. $1.8 per 1000
gallons) are predicted for a 30 mgd plant in Tampa,
Florida. At this price all urban areas in the world with
access to saline water could have a plentiful water supply
at a price that is comparable to typical values for urban
water supply around the globe. While this does not give
an instant solution to the problem in many poor cities in
the developing world, it does indicate that reasonable
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economically achievable technology can solve the
problems as they develop.
Idiosyncrasy of Water Institutions
Unfortunately, one water fact-of-life makes it very
difficult to implement the types of technical and
social breakthroughs already conceptually available;
the hurdle is that property rights, institutions, and
laws vary widely from country to country -- even
within countries. The plethora of institutions and
legal regimes in all countries tends to get in the way
of rational water management. In many cases it is
impossible to reallocate or trade between conflicting
water uses. The confusion allows for the
entrenchment of bad conventional institutional views
and blocks consideration of newer approaches.
Approaches such as public/private partnerships are
often difficult to implement under these Balkanized
conditions. Understanding how to devise effective
water governance is now imperative (Rogers and
Hall, 2002).
Sanitation, Health, and Human Dignity
The major reason for widespread dissatisfaction
about water issues in developing countries stems
from the vast numbers who have no access to
adequate drinking water or sanitation. The numbers
often used are one billion without adequate water
supply and two billion without access to adequate
sanitation. Whatever the actual numbers are, they
represent a massive failure by national governments
and the world community to deal with these two
issues, which involve human dignity much more than
economics. It is economics, however, that drives the
non-performance in meeting these water needs. It is
simply beyond the financial capabilities of existing
governmental and international agencies to cover the
cost of providing conventional water and sanitation to
these persons and their increasing numbers. Either
large new sources of finance will be needed, or the
conventional views of water-borne sanitation will
have to be changed toward well-known ecological
sanitation practices that use little or no water.
Trans-boundary Conflicts
Two or more riparian countries share more than 261
river basins worldwide, and 40 percent of the global
population lives within these basins (Wolf et al.,
1999). Often the basins are shared by water-rich and
water-poor countries or by heavily polluting
industries in some countries and not in others. Since
there is no strong international law governing the
resolution of trans-boundary water quality and

quantity disputes, the potential for physical and armed
conflict remains high. This issue needs careful
consideration by riparians and the regional family of
nations to head off these conflicts from becoming worse.
Uncertain Future of Water
Water has always been a fugitive resource with high
variability. From the first records ever kept on the globe,
the variability of the water supply has been first and
foremost in the minds of priests, judges, kings, and
statesmen. The first half of the 20th century was a period
when statisticians first attempted to find long-term trends
in hydrological records. By the end of the century,
hydrologists were searching for evidence of long-term
anthropogenic climate change caused by greenhouse
gases. Many conflicting data sets and theories have been
reviewed with contradictory results (see Easterling, 2000
and Vinnikov and Robock, 2002). While at present there
is no consensus as to potential change in variability of
precipitation over the next 5 decades, there seems to be a
consensus of increased precipitation over large areas of
the globe and a rise of sea level from 0.1m - 0.3m. The
recent IPCC report, however, does little to resolve these
anomalies.
While most of the discussion about the uncertain future
of water has focused upon the water supply side of the
equation, much larger uncertainties can be expected on
the water demand side influenced by demographic
parameters, economic growth, technology change, and
life styles. There is a pressing need for water planners
and agencies to improve their approaches to resolving
resource issues with such high levels of uncertainty.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER RESOURCES
OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
An old political saying is that: Facts are facts, but
perceptions are reality. In the world of climate
predictions it is so hard to separate fact from fact and fact
from fiction that many observers substitute perceptions
for reality. Major sources of facts in the area of climate
change are the three IPPC Reports (1990, 1996, and
2001). Despite being a mine of extremely useful
information, these reports are difficult to use because of
the innumerable assumptions made by each strand of the
overall story line. In other words, due to the cascading of
assumptions the facts become hard to distinguish from
fiction.
THREE MAJOR ISSUES FACING DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
There are several recent reviews of water issues in
developing countries (Raskin et al., 1997 and Gleick,
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2000) focused upon the average availability of water
as a resource. In dealing with water development,
however, we have to deal with the social and
economic dimensions along with the physical and
environmental factors. I believe that there are three
major issues relating climate change to water
development in developing countries; first, the
expected lifetime of water infrastructure; second, the
effects of changes in variability and extremes under
changed climates on water availability; and third, the
benefits and costs associated with allocation of water
among uses under altered climatic conditions.

What are typical economic lives of development
projects? Burton and van Aalst (1999) reviewed six case
studies of proposed World Bank water investments that
showed economic lives ranging from 25 to 50 years and
levels of protection ranging from one-in-ten year events
to one-in-fifty year events. So none of the projects
examined would likely experience serious economic
difficulties, since their life spans are coming to an end
just as the climate impacts become noticeable. At that
point of time the responsible agency would then select
another project that would have climate change taken
into account in its design.

The Life of Water Infrastructure

Change in Variability and Extremes with Climate
Change

The life of water infrastructure does not generally
receive serious attention in the water planning
literature. This is probably because there are three
different concepts of the life of a project, the first
deals with the planning life that is chosen for
planning water projects. This is often taken to be 50
years for dams and reservoirs and maybe 15 to 20
years for water and wastewater treatment plants, and
is often viewed as an arbitrary choice. The second is
the physical life of the project. For water projects this
can be a very long time (there are dams and
aqueducts built by the Romans 2000 years ago and
still in use in parts of Europe and North Africa). The
third concept is the economic life of the project. This
is the most difficult to assess since it depends upon a
variety of socio-economic parameters as well as
engineering parameters.
Often the planning life and the physical life are
assumed to be identical and the analysis of the project
is carried out for some 50 years. The economic life is
calculated based upon the marginal cost of
maintaining the project functioning so that the
benefits for an additional year’s output of a project is
just equaled by its costs. Depending upon the social
rate of discount and the climate impacts this could be
a significantly shorter period of less than 20 years
(see Rogers in Frederick and Rosenberg, 1994).
One can immediately see the difficulty. If the climate
is changing it only becomes significant for the most
exaggerated scenarios explored by the TAR after
about 30 to 50 years in the future. This implies that
taking climate change into account will not have
serious effects upon short-lived water infrastructure
in developing countries even under the most extreme
scenarios. If the projects have an economic life of
more than 50 years, then taking account of potential
climate change in their planning could be considered
a wise investment.

From a water resources development aspect any change
in the extreme hydrological events or the variability of
the events themselves could have a major impact on the
development of the resource. There are data on the
observed behavior of extremes in North America and a
few other locations (Easterling et al., 2000) that show
convincing evidence for an upward trend in minimum
temperatures, but no trend for maximum temperatures
over the 20th century. This is accompanied by an
increase in heavy precipitation and a small increase in
total precipitation. Other regions such as Ethiopia, Kenya
and Thailand show large decreases in both. In a
seemingly contradictory paper, Vinikov and Robock
(2002) see no increase in the variability of annual
precipitation, Palmer Drought Severity Index, and sea
level variations for the U.S. over the past 100 years, and
the All-India monsoon rainfall index and the Southern
Oscillation index over the same century. Part of the
problem of reconciling these two papers is that time
intervals chosen were different, with the Easterling paper
using time intervals of days and the Vinikov and Robock
paper using annually aggregated data. Whatever the
resolution of the differing interpretations given by these
two recent papers, they serve to emphasize the point
made earlier that in some cases we cannot easily label
the observed data as “fact” or “fiction.”
The Costs Associated with Allocation among Water uses
Under Altered Climatic Conditions
This is the most contentious of the issues facing
developing countries. All countries, whether they like it
or not, have essentially de facto allocated water among
the various water users and water uses. The problem is
how to deal with the economic and social costs if it turns
out that the traditional allocations lead to serious
shortfalls in some water using sectors. This is essentially
a political problem that can only be resolved by strong
political action. We see various claimants laying claim to
future short water supplies for their own interest groups
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Climate Water Issues

Water Development Issues

Incr/decr ppt

WS and sanitation

Change seasonality

Food production

Current Needs

$30 billion/yr

$30-35 billion/yr
Change variability

Energy production

Change extremes

Industrial water

$7.5 billion/yr

$7.5 billion/yr
Sea level rise

Transportation

? billion/yr
Change assimilative
of surface waters

Flood management

? billion/yr
Change stream biota

Drought management

? billion/yr
CO2 fertilization

Coastal protection

? Billion/yr
$75-80 billion/yr

Figure 1. Scope of Developing Country Water Needs and Current Climate Water Concerns

(for example see Seckler et al., 1998, for agricultural
claims and Johnson et al., 2001, for domestic supply
and ecosystem claims). The clinching argument for
reallocation probably lies in the costs associated with
climate change. Many guesstimates have been made
as to the costs of meeting future water demands in the
developing countries in the absence of climate
change considerations.
Figure 1 shows the eight major water consequences
of climate change and relates them to the eight major
water development issues faced in developing
countries. It also gives estimates from the World
Water Commission on the needed annual investment
to meet the demands placed upon the resources until
2025. In an ambitious paper, Tol (2002) estimated the
economic benefits and costs of climate change in the
developing countries by broad regions. Table 1
summarizes the results from all sectors (agriculture,
forestry, ecosystems, etc.) and of total benefits by
specific water sectors by region.
The interesting thing to notice in the table is that
quite severe climate change is not necessarily a
disaster in all of the regions and all sectors. Some of
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the regions report positive benefits and some negative.
The overall picture shows an annual net benefit of $38
billion per year from all sectors and all regions.
However, the consequences for water resources are
almost all negative with an estimated global annual loss
of $79 billion. Surprisingly, these damages are almost
identical with the estimates from the WWC (in Figure 1)
of annual investment needs to achieve sustainable water
sector development.
CONCLUSIONS
Assuming that the recent IPCC estimates of likely
climate change over the next 50 years were to occur,
there is some reason to believe that the consequences
will not be so disastrous as might be expected if we were
to carry on our planning and development of water
resources using conventional wisdom rather than
adjusting our actions to what current conventional
approaches tell us. There are many tried and true ways of
reducing water demands in agriculture, industry and in
households, that, if applied, could make a transition from
the present profligate use of resources to a much more
planned and managed future.
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Region

Total Annual
Regional Damages (-)
and Benefits (+)

Total Annual
Regional Damages (-)
and Benefits (+)
for Water Resources

(+) $57

(-) $76

(+) $4
(-) $1
(-) $14
(+) $9
(-) $17
(+) 38

(-) $1
(-) $1
(-) $1
(+) $2
(-) $2
(-) $79

Central and Eastern Europe &
the Former Soviet Union
Middle East
Latin America
South & Southeast Asia
Centrally Planned Asia
Africa
Total
Amounts are shown in billions of U.S. dollars.

Table 1. Future annual effects due to a climate change of 1oC and 0.2m sea level rise (Source: Tol, 2002)
Note: Without climate change the World Water Commission estimated annual investment needs in 2025 of US$180
billion (water and sanitation $75 billion; agriculture $30 billion; and environmental, energy, and industry $75
billion).
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